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 Sustaining large-scale public goods requires individuals to make environmentally 
friendly decisions today to benefit future generations1–6. Recent research suggests that 
second-order normative beliefs are more powerful predictors of behavior than first-order 
personal beliefs7,8. We explored the role second-order normative beliefs—the belief that 
community members believe saving energy helps the environment—play in curbing energy 
use. We first analyzed a dataset of 211 independent, randomized controlled trials conducted 
in 27 U.S. states by Opower, a company that uses comparative information about energy 
consumption to reduce household energy usage (pooled N=16,198,595). Building off the 
finding that the energy savings varied between 0.81% and 2.55% across states, we matched 
this energy use data with a survey we conducted of over 2,000 individuals in those same states 
on their first-order personal and second-order normative beliefs. We found that second-
order normative beliefs predicted energy savings but first-order personal beliefs did not. A 
subsequent pre-registered experiment provides causal evidence for the role of second-order 
normative beliefs in predicting energy conservation above first-order personal beliefs. Our 
results suggest that second-order normative beliefs play a critical role in promoting energy 
conservation and have important implications for policy-makers concerned with curbing the 
detrimental consequences of climate change. 
Although new technologies that may help limit the effects of climate change are becoming 
increasingly widespread and affordable, behavioral and interpersonal barriers continue to hinder 
the adoption of sustainable behavior. To design policies needed to address climate change and 
other environmental and social public goods, researchers need to more closely understand the 
factors influencing conservation behavior and how interventions can best make use of these 
factors. Currently, interventions often target an individual’s first-order personal beliefs, i.e., one’s 
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understanding of oneself and one’s world9. Many people in the United States continue to believe 
that climate change is not a real threat or a human-induced problem10 and one might expect that 
targeting these beliefs will lead to attitude and behavioral changes that may help reduce the impact 
of climate change. 
However, such information-centered approaches are both expensive and surprisingly 
ineffective in influencing conservation behavior11. Research has found that first-order personal 
beliefs are often resistant to change, especially deeply held views such as environmental beliefs9,12. 
For example, one study found that providing car drivers with information about savings from 
reduced car usage, or information on environmental harm, or both, had virtually no effect on their 
driving behavior and instead lead to psychological commitment to their initial personal belief11. 
Attempting to change an individual’s first-order personal beliefs and behaviors, especially if they 
are central to an individual’s self-view, has proven to be challenging13. Subsidies for energy-
efficient goods, as well as educational campaigns that aim to provide accurate information on 
climate change and recognize it as a threat to human society, are also expensive and have had fairly 
limited success14,15. 
Instead, recent research has found that better predictors of behavior than first-order 
personal beliefs are second-order normative beliefs, i.e., perceptions about what is commonly 
believed7,8. For example, decades of research in cultural psychology has assumed that cross-
cultural differences in behavior are driven by differences in personal values. But recent studies 
have found that second-order normative beliefs are better predictors of culturally consistent 
behavior16. One study found that Chinese participants who believe that most of their fellow citizens 
hold collectivistic values acted in a more culturally consistent way17. Similarly, blame judgments 
by Americans and Koreans were more culturally consistent to the extent that individuals believed 
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that other citizens held culturally consistent beliefs18. Across both studies, second-order normative 
beliefs predicted how people behaved and judged others, over and above culturally relevant first-
order personal beliefs. 
Early work in prejudice reduction also theorized that interventions were effective to the 
extent that they changed people’s first-order personal beliefs19,20. However, research has found 
that interventions designed to decrease prejudice and bullying are successful mainly due to their 
influence on second-order normative beliefs, rather than first-order personal beliefs. For example, 
a large-scale field experiment in Rwanda found that when a radio soap opera featured prejudice-
reduction messages, intergroup prejudice decreased through listeners’ perceptions of second-order 
normative beliefs; conversely, these messages had little impact on people’s first-order personal 
beliefs. Overall, the radio program, which ran over the course of a year and repeatedly exposed 
groups of listeners to prejudice-reducing messages, influenced listeners’ beliefs of the collective 
norm, which then shifted their behaviors in the direction of that norm21,22. Similarly, changing a 
peer group’s public reaction towards bullying alters student’s harassment behavior by altering 
perceptions of collective norms23. Several lines of research thus converge to show that second-
order normative beliefs are a powerful predictor of behavior.  
We explore the importance of second-order normative beliefs in predicting energy 
conservation behavior beyond first-order personal beliefs in the context of descriptive norm 
information. In recent years, a wide variety of studies have shown that people change their 
behavior in response to receiving information about the descriptive norm, i.e., what the majority 
of people in one’s community are doing. From increasing honest tax reporting24, reducing alcohol 
abuse25,26, to reducing energy consumption27,28, there is little doubt empirically that the provision 
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of descriptive norm information is an effective means to initiate behavior change, but various 
theories have been proposed to why that is the case. 
One popular account7,8 suggests that descriptive norms provide previously unknown 
information and by doing so shape an individual’s views of what is the right thing to do: the 
reasoning goes that if everyone is doing it, then it must be a sensible thing to do. However, if this 
were the case, then the behavioral change produced by the provision of descriptive norm 
information should be relatively similar across different areas. A number of studies do not provide 
evidence for this conclusion, finding that descriptive norm interventions do not affect all 
individuals equally24–30. 
Take the large set of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) carried out by Opower, a firm 
that is contracted by utility companies to help meet energy conservation requirements. Over the 
last few years, Opower has systematically provided descriptive norm information across the United 
States and tested its effects on energy conservation behavior. We analyzed a dataset we obtained 
of 211 RCTs using descriptive norm interventions across the 27 states in which Opower operates 
and find that the effectiveness of norm information varies between 0.81% reduction in some RCTs 
and 2.55% in others—a relative difference of about 300% between states. While the provision of 
descriptive norm information has successfully reduced energy consumption overall, there is 
remarkable variation between RCTs. This makes it highly unlikely that descriptive norm 
information consistently and solely changes individuals’ views of what is the right thing to do. 
We therefore propose an alternative account: Instead of descriptive norms creating 
behavior change by altering first-order personal beliefs, as has been previously suggested7,8, we 
hypothesize that descriptive norm information combines with second-order normative beliefs to 
influence behavior. Thus, to understand how descriptive norm information influences behavior, it 
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is necessary to consider an individual’s second-order normative beliefs. We propose that 
descriptive norm information predicts energy conservation behavior when an individual holds a 
second-order normative belief that is consistent with the descriptive norm information. That is, we 
argue that people follow descriptive norm information more when they believe other people in 
their community support that norm. This is in part the case because, as early as childhood31, 
individuals adapt to and internalize norms to avoid violating them because norm violations can be 
costly: offenders may be punished, avoided, ostracized, shamed, or directly attacked by their 
community for violating the norm32–36. Additionally, not sharing normative views with others 
hinders one’s ability to form close relationships with them37. Conversely, those who comply with 
a norm are rewarded for their efforts by being valued highly by their community33,38.  
To test these predictions, we first analyzed a large set of RCT results carried out by 
Opower. After establishing the predictive effect of second-order normative beliefs on energy 
conservation, we subsequently conducted an experimental study that manipulated second-order 
normative beliefs to provide causal evidence. 
As previously mentioned, the provision of descriptive norm information showed wide 
variation in effectiveness across the RCTs within the 27 states in which Opower operates. We 
applied our theoretical framework to clarify the roles of first-order personal and second-order 
normative beliefs in explaining the impact of descriptive norm interventions. We predicted that an 
individual’s likelihood to change their behavior—and thus, save energy—depends on both 
exposure to descriptive norm information (i.e., the Opower treatment assignment) and an 
individual’s second-order normative beliefs (i.e., whether an individual believes their neighbors or 
community care about energy conservation). More precisely, we predicted that second-order 
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normative beliefs would predict energy conservation behavior over and above first-order personal 
beliefs. 
 In our first study, we tested the relationship between first-order personal and second-order 
normative beliefs on behavior change following descriptive norm interventions by combining two 
large datasets. The first dataset is comprised of 211 large-scale RCTs from Opower. This dataset 
includes energy consumption rates at the RCT-level from 16,198,595 households over 7 years 
across 27 states. Households in these energy savings trials were randomly assigned to either a 
control or treatment condition. In the treatment condition, households received regular descriptive 
norm information about their neighbors’ energy consumption. In addition to the descriptive norm 
information, participants in the Opower trials also received prescriptive norm information 
regarding their current energy conservation (e.g., “GOOD” and a smiley face in Figure 1 below). 
This additional information was introduced to ensure that participants who were already 
conserving more energy than their neighbors would not change their behavior to consume more 
energy, as earlier studies have found28. In contrast, households in the control condition received 
no additional communications and were treated no differently than they would have been otherwise 
(for a more detailed explanation, see 27,30,39). The dataset that is the focus of the current 
investigation represents an expanded version of a prior set of Opower data which contained 111 
RCTs involving 8.6 million households39. 
All Opower RCTs include a core program element, a so-called “Home Energy Report” (see 
Figure 1) that graphically illustrates the focal household’s energy usage and the average energy 
usage of similar, nearby households over the same time period. While small variations in the layout 
of the energy reports exist, the fundamental aspects of these trials are identical (i.e., a series of 
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comparable “procedural field experiments” 40). It is therefore highly unlikely that the variability 
of the outcome across RCTs can be explained by small differences in experimental design.  
--- 
Figure 1 about here 
--- 
Figure 1. An example of an Opower Home Energy Report. Customers in the treatment condition receive a bi-
monthly (or less frequent) mailing that compares their energy usage with that of similar, nearby households. These 
descriptive norm messages have been shown to be effective in influencing people to conserve energy, but the 
effectiveness of descriptive norm varies across U.S. states. 
 
The most likely source for the variation is where in the United States the trial was 
conducted. Indeed, we find that the effectiveness of the provision of descriptive norm information 
in achieving energy savings varies on a state-by-state basis (M=1.59%, SD=.50%, min=.81%, 
max=2.55%), which we take as a starting point for our investigation. 
The dependent variable in our research is the standardized average monthly rate of energy 
conservation by RCT trial in each state during Opower’s trial period. The energy savings rate is 
defined as the percentage of energy saved in the treatment group relative to the control group usage 
by RCT trial. The energy savings data arises from real behavioral changes in household behavior 
as measured by utility companies. 
The second dataset comes from a sample of survey respondents (N=2,001) from the same 
27 states. The questionnaire answered by these respondents measured both first-order personal and 
second-order normative beliefs. Participants were asked whether they themselves believe that 
energy conservation helps save the environment (first-order personal beliefs) and whether they 
believe the majority of their neighbors believe saving energy helps save the environment (second-
order normative beliefs). Both questions were scored on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 7 (very much). We aggregated individual level responses from the survey to the state level, as 
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this was the level at which we could match to the Opower RCT data, which (in line with ref. 39) 
were aggregated on the RCT-level within a state and used as the unit of analysis. Unless otherwise 
noted, we cluster robust standard errors at the state level (for methodological details, see the 
Supplementary Information, SI).  
In the regressions presented below, we control for several variables previously associated 
with the Opower treatment effect. For example, treatment effects vary considerably by how long 
the trial has been running39. We therefore followed the regression strategy outlined in ref. 39, 
controlling for program duration. Consistent with past work, we weighted observations by the 
inverse variance of the cohort size. We also controlled for the average household energy usage in 
the state, population density, and survey respondents’ demographics. Finally, we use standardized 
z-scores of both the independent and dependent variables for the analysis because our variables 
have different magnitudes and units; however, not standardizing these variables does not alter the 
significance or interpretation of our results41 (for more details on the analytical strategy, see SI). 
We hypothesized that second-order normative beliefs would predict the effectiveness of 
descriptive norm information on the energy savings rate over and above first-order personal 
beliefs. This is exactly what we found: second-order normative beliefs predicted energy savings 
rates (coeff=.755, SE=.323, p=.030; Model 1 in Table 1). In contrast, first-order personal beliefs 
did not predict energy savings rates (coeff=.209, SE=.324, p=.527; Model 2 in Table 1). These 
results hold when entering both predictors simultaneously: second-order normative beliefs 
predicted energy savings rates (coeff=1.138, SE=.446, p=.020), while first-order personal beliefs 
did not (coeff=-.696, SE=.478, p=.162; see Model 3 in Table 1). In addition, because first-order 
personal beliefs and second-order normative beliefs are moderately correlated (rPearson=.58, 
rSpearman=.62, p<.001), we tested for multicollinearity, and the variance inflation factor remained 
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within acceptable standards42 (i.e. below 10). Furthermore, the results were robust to the inclusion 
of control variables (Model 5 in Table 1) and were similar when analyzing RCTs from states with 
at least 50 survey respondents (N=195) as well as when we included every RCT (Model 6 in Table 
1). Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of Models 3 (main sample without covariates), 5 
(main sample with covariates), and 6 (full sample with covariates). 
--- 
Figure 2 about here 
--- 
Figure 2. Second-order normative beliefs predict energy savings in 211 large-scale energy savings RCTs (pooled 
N = 16,198,595. The effect of second-order normative beliefs is plotted for a regression model with standardized 
coefficients based on the main sample (i.e., states that had at least 50 survey respondents) without and with covariates, 
as well as for a regression model with all states. Regardless of survey response rate, and covariates, second-order 
normative beliefs significantly predicted savings rate in all model specifications, while first-order personal beliefs did 
not. For each estimate, the outer (thin) error bar represents the 99% confidence interval, the middle error bar the 95%, 
and the inner (thick) error bar the 90% confidence intervals.  
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Table 1. Second-order normative beliefs predicted energy savings in 211 large-scale energy savings RCTs (pooled N 
= 16,198,595), whereas first-order personal beliefs did not. Model 1 shows that second-order normative beliefs 
predicted energy savings rates, while Model 2 shows that first-order personal beliefs did not predict energy savings 
rates. Model 3 lists the control variables derived from past research on Opower trials. When control variables are 
added to the main model in Model 4, the effect of second-order normative beliefs remains statistically significant. The 
main sample of states with at least 50 respondents is used in Models 1–5. All states regardless of sample size are 
included in Model 6. All variables are standardized (z-scores). Observations are weighted using cohort size by inverse 
variance. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state-level. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
VARIABLES       
       
Second-Order 
Normative Beliefs 
.755*  1.138*  1.030* 1.082*** 
(.323)  (.446)  (.385) (.281) 
First-Order Personal 
Beliefs 
 .209 -.696  .006 -.341 
 (.324) (.478)  (.629) (.499) 
Control group daily 
energy usage 
   .030 .072 .080 
   (.071) (.066) (.069) 
Program start date    -.370*** -.341*** -.339*** 
    (.050) (.052) (.051) 
State population density    -.075 -.154* -.124* 
    (.071) (.074) (.061) 
Average age of 
respondents in state 
   -.084 .298 .232 
   (.277) (.272) (.256) 
% female respondents in 
state 
   -.702 -.588 -.595 
   (.462) (.531) (.433) 
Constant -.240** -.214* -.237** -.147* -.173** -.165** 
 (.072) (.081) (.072) (.063) (.056) (.057) 
       
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 211 
R-squared .031 .002 .041 .250 .283 .264 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1 
 
In the SI, we report further robustness checks using alternative sampling weights to control 
for survey uptake in each state, restricting our analysis only to trials without imputed averages for 
missing variables, including survey respondents who did not pass the attention quiz, and using the 
amount of energy saved as the outcome variable; results are qualitatively similar across all 
specifications. In our supplemental analyses, we rule out, for example, that our effects are driven 
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by differential sample select biases across states. To do so, we use inverse-variance weights based 
on representative gender and age demographics in each state from the 2010 U.S. Census, and 
replicate our findings (see Tables S1–S5, and SI for more information). 
In sum, the results from our analysis of the Opower data show that second-order normative 
beliefs, but not first-order personal beliefs, are associated with an increased energy savings rate 
following the provision of the energy comparison information. This data provides correlational 
support into the relationship between second-order normative beliefs and energy conservation 
behavior. Next, we conducted an experimental study to provide causal evidence for the role of 
second-order normative beliefs. 
To provide causal evidence for the role of second-order normative beliefs in predicting 
energy conservation behavior, we conducted a pre-registered experimental study (see 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=xy3a4f). Both the sample size and the exclusion criteria we 
describe below were pre-registered in advance of data collection. We recruited 561 participants 
(Mage = 36.96, SDage = 11.84, 52.23% female) from AMT, who were first asked to indicate what 
state and county they lived in (see SI for additional information). Next, all participants were asked 
to imagine that their energy provider recently sent them a bill including information about their 
energy consumption. This information was presented in text and graphically and showed that 
participants used 28% more energy than their neighbors, and was closely modeled to resemble the 
neighborhood comparison information that Opower sends to its customers (see Figure 3). 
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--- 
Figure 3 about here 
--- 
Figure 3. Information given to all participants about their energy consumption in the experimental study. The design 
was closely modeled after the information Opower sends to its customers. The x-axis represents the amount of energy 
consumed. 
 
All participants were then told that we would access information about the energy 
conservation beliefs of individuals living in their home county. A loading screen appeared on the 
page, which took four seconds to retrieve information about participants’ home county. The 
information subsequently provided to participants represents our random assignment to the low 
second-order beliefs and high second-order beliefs condition (for a similar methodology, see ref. 
43). 
In the low second-order beliefs condition, participants were told that their county was in 
the 11th percentile of energy conservation beliefs in the United States. We further elaborated, 
“[t]hat means that there exists very low awareness that households in your home county can help 
save the environment: most of your neighbors do not believe that saving energy is important to 
help the environment.” In the high second-order beliefs condition, participants were told that their 
county was in the 89th percentile of energy conservation beliefs in the United States. We further 
elaborated, “[t]hat means that there exists very high awareness that households in your home 
county can help save the environment: most of your neighbors believe that saving energy is 
important to help the environment.” 
As our dependent variable, we assessed participants’ likelihood of reducing their energy 
consumption with the following question: “how willing would you be to decrease your energy 
consumption in the next month?”. Responses were given on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at 
all willing) to 7 (extremely willing).  
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As a manipulation check, we asked participants to report their second-order beliefs with 
the question: “To what extent do you believe your neighbors (or community) think that reducing 
household energy contributes to saving the environment?”. To control for participants’ first-order 
beliefs in our analyses, we also assessed participants first-order beliefs with the question: “To what 
extent do you believe that reducing household energy contributes to saving the environment?’. 
Both questions were presented in counter-balanced order, and responses to both questions were 
given on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Because the order of questions 
had no significant effect on responses to these questions, we collapsed across order in our 
subsequent analyses. At the end of the study, participants were asked whether they believed the 
information provided about energy conservation beliefs in their home county. Consistent with our 
pre-registration plan, we excluded suspicious participants; importantly, all results hold with and 
without any data exclusions (see SI), and there was no statistically significant difference in 
suspicion across conditions (t(559) = .83, p = .41). 
To summarize the experimental set-up: we manipulated second-order beliefs, held constant 
the descriptive norms information, and measured and controlled for first-order personal beliefs. 
As a result, our design allows us to test whether second-order normative beliefs have a causal 
effect on energy conservation behavior over and above first-order personal beliefs. 
We first examined whether the manipulation of second-order beliefs was successful. We 
find that participants in the high second-order beliefs condition had significantly higher levels of 
second-order normative beliefs (M=5.66, SD=1.22) than participants in the low second-order 
beliefs condition (M=4.01, SD=1.45; t(346)=11.45, p<.001). We thus conclude that our 
manipulation was successful. 
Running Head: SECOND-ORDER NORMATIVE BELIEFS & ENERGY CONSERVATION 
Page 15 of 33 
We subsequently tested whether the manipulation of second-order beliefs influenced 
participants’ willingness to reduce their energy consumption in the next month. We find that 
participants in the high second-order beliefs condition were significantly more willing to reduce 
their energy consumption (M=5.83, SD=1.17) than participants in the low second-order beliefs 
condition (M =5.33, SD=1.30; t(346)=3.65, p<.001). The effect of condition holds even when 
controlling for measured first-order personal beliefs (B=.332, SE=.115, p=.004). We note that, 
unlike the first study based on Opower field data, higher first-order personal beliefs were 
significantly related to an increased willingness to reduce energy consumption (B=.557, SE =.044, 
p<.001). The 95% confidence intervals around the experimental manipulation of second-order 
normative beliefs condition and the measurement of first-order personal beliefs overlapped, 
indicating that they are both of similar size..  
The results of the experimental study provide support for the causal role of second-order 
beliefs in the formation of energy-saving intentions. Consider that all participants in this study 
received the same descriptive norm information that they used more energy than their neighbors, 
similar to what participants in the Opower treatment received. However, when additionally told 
that their neighbors believe saving energy is important to them, participants were more willing to 
subsequently reduce their energy consumption, in comparison to participants who were told that 
their neighbors do not believe that saving energy is important to them. These results provide further 
evidence of the important role of second-order normative beliefs in predicting energy savings 
behavior, over and above first-order personal beliefs. 
 Current approaches to reduce energy consumption typically focus on interventions that 
attempt to motivate individuals to change their first-order personal beliefs9–11,14,15. These 
interventions make intuitive sense: by educating and informing citizens about the importance and 
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dangers of global warming, policy-makers may intend to change the first-order personal beliefs of 
its citizens. But this information-centered approach is expensive and often inefficient in altering 
behavior11. We believe that a better policy approach for changing behavior requires policy-makers 
and researchers to more closely understand what factors drive behavior change and how these 
factors can best be implemented at all levels of policy-making. 
 To this end, sustainable energy-use behavior—one important element in curbing climate 
change—has been encouraged in recent years through the application of descriptive norms17,18. 
But these norm interventions vary in their effectiveness, with some prior research unable to find 
any effect of these norm-based manipulations on behavior altogether24–30. Indeed, in the large-
scale Opower dataset we present here, the effectiveness of descriptive norm information in 
producing reductions in energy usage varied by 300% across different states. Because 
interventions need to be maximally successful to limit the effects of global warming, we set out to 
understand why descriptive norms worked better in some states than others. To do so, we leveraged 
recent research on the importance of second-order normative in predicting behavior change. Stated 
simply, we proposed that second-order normative beliefs towards energy conservation would 
predict energy-saving behavior, over and above first-order personal beliefs. 
 Our findings provide insight into why descriptive norm messaging produces a change in 
behavioral outcomes in some cases, but not in others. In a dataset of 211 RCTs, we found that the 
provision of descriptive norm information was associated with greater energy conservation in 
those states where individuals believed that energy conservation was valued by members of their 
community, i.e., higher second-order normative beliefs. In a subsequent experimental study, we 
provide causal evidence for our proposition that receiving descriptive norm information about a 
household’s energy usage relative to similar neighbors is more effective when household members 
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believe their neighbors value energy conservation. Because this experiment manipulated second-
order beliefs, while holding constant normative information, and measuring and controlling for the 
first-order beliefs, it demonstrates that second-order beliefs have a causal effect over and above 
first-order beliefs.  
These results mirror earlier findings that both cross-cultural differences and prejudice 
reduction are driven by second-order normative beliefs16–18,21–23. When we think our community 
cares about a behavior, we worry more about the costs of norm violation33,38,44. Indeed, second-
order normative beliefs may have implications for our understanding of sustainable and 
cooperative behaviors more generally. For example, recent work finds that beliefs about others’ 
intention to cooperate shape one’s intuitive cooperativeness in social dilemmas 45. Under what 
circumstances cooperation is intuitive (i.e., the default behavior) has recently received 
considerable attention 46–48. In the context of sustaining large-scale public goods, such as 
combating climate change, saving energy or recycling, future work needs to be conducted to 
further our understanding of the conditions—including the role of second-order normative 
beliefs—which lead to intuitive, habitual, sustainable behaviors 49,50. 
These findings have important implications for policy-makers. Based on our findings that 
the combination of descriptive norms and second-order normative beliefs is associated with greater 
energy conservation behavior, utility companies could consider implementing descriptive norm 
information programs in areas where second-order normative beliefs are higher, as they are likely 
to be more effective there. In addition, because prior research has shown that second-order 
normative beliefs are more amenable to change than first-order personal beliefs21,23,51, our results 
also suggest that a communication strategy focused on changing second-order normative beliefs, 
in combination with providing descriptive norms, may be more effective than current approaches 
Running Head: SECOND-ORDER NORMATIVE BELIEFS & ENERGY CONSERVATION 
Page 18 of 33 
that focus only on impacting individuals’ first-order personal beliefs. For example, communities 
could engage in public demonstrations of desirable behaviors, especially those that may help limit 
the effects of climate change.  
We chose to rely on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) for the study population because 
AMT workers tend to be younger, less wealthy, and less educated but more racially diverse than 
the general U.S. population and comparable survey samples52,53. This is important because prior 
research found that wealthier, well-educated households were more likely to be in neighborhoods 
that were early adopters of the Opower trials, and those early trials tended to have higher savings 
rates39. However, if anything, this implies that our findings are a conservative test of our 
hypothesis: we find that second-order normative beliefs predict conservation rates, even among a 
less wealthy, less educated population. In addition, in the SI we report analyses where we created 
weights for gender and age bins for each state based on U.S. Census data, and all results remain 
qualitatively similar. This provides additional evidence that differential sample selection biases 
(i.e., non-randomness) are unlikely drivers of our effects. That said, we encourage further research 
into different population segments to better understand the heterogeneous effects of wealth, 
education, and other demographics on sustainable energy behaviors. 
In addition, future research would benefit from investigating other levels of analysis of 
first-order personal and second-order normative beliefs. For example, it is feasible that first-order 
personal and second-order normative beliefs also vary within a state, such that communities with 
high second-order normative beliefs exist in states with low first-order personal beliefs (e.g., 
Austin in Texas) and vice versa54,55. Moreover, while the Opower intervention focuses specifically 
on energy use in households, curbing individual-level energy use is only one of the many factors 
to limit the devastating effects of climate change. Indeed, other important approaches include 
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urging individuals to change their equipment, such as installing solar panels or insulating their 
house. It is possible that second-order normative beliefs may also influence individuals to adopt a 
wider range of energy-efficient household equipment and a sustainable lifestyle, beyond the 
individual-level energy use measured by the Opower trials. A more detailed mapping of first-order 
personal and second-order normative beliefs to other sustainable behaviors may not only deepen 
our understanding of the underlying psychology of descriptive norms but could also help refine 
climate change communication strategies. 
Finally, subsequent research could investigate additional mechanisms for why second-
order normative believes combine with descriptive norm information to predict energy savings. 
Our theorizing built off prior literature in cross-cultural psychology and prejudice reduction, which 
proposes that individuals worry more about the costs of norm violation when they have higher 
second-order normative beliefs33,38,44. However, we believe there are likely additional pathways. 
One such possibility concerns the role of attributions56–58. Consider that a neighbors’ reduced 
energy use could be attributed to the punishment of norm violation (“their neighbors scolded them 
for leaving their lights on”), volition (“they saved energy because they took conscious steps to do 
so”), or happenstance (“they saved energy because they weren’t home much in the last few 
months”). One possibility is that higher second-order normative beliefs increase one’s tendency to 
conclude that one’s neighbors purposefully reduced their energy consumption. As a result of these 
second-order normative beliefs, the descriptive norm information becomes a more relevant 
standard and more likely to guide individuals’ behavior. We encourage future research to further 
uncover the mechanisms involved in the role of second-order normative beliefs. 
Ultimately, combating environmentally damaging behaviors requires individual-level 
cooperation1–6, which is difficult to achieve because self-interest can quickly lead to free-
Running Head: SECOND-ORDER NORMATIVE BELIEFS & ENERGY CONSERVATION 
Page 20 of 33 
riding32,33,38. Past research has found that how we view our community and how likely we think 
they will choose to cooperate rather than free-ride exerts a strong influence over our own decision 
to cooperate59. But our results suggest an additional component: what we think our community 
thinks about an issue affects our likelihood to act. In other words, people might generally agree 
that reducing energy consumption is needed to help the environment and save our planet—but to 
make it happen, they need to believe that others care about it too. 
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Methods 
Ethical Approval 
All participants in the online survey and the online experiment consented to participating 
in this study, and ethical approval for both the survey and the experiment, as well as the use of 
the Opower data, was obtained from Columbia University’s Institutional Review Board. 
Opower Context 
 The company Opower (acquired by Oracle in 2016; subsequently referred to as Opower) 
built a commercial platform to promote household energy conservation. As of the time of data 
collection, Opower operated in 27 states across the United States in collaboration with energy 
providers. Opower runs randomized controlled trials (RCT) with most energy providers they work 
with to measure program effectiveness. Over the past decade, Opower has conducted over 200 
RCTs testing the effectiveness of descriptive norm adherence on energy consumption across 27 
states. Opower programs employ RCTs where program households are selected, matched to 
similar households based on their energy usage, and randomly assigned to a treatment or control 
group. Treatment group households receive information on how their energy consumption 
compares to the energy consumption of similar households. The treatment effect—energy savings 
rate—is defined as the percentage of energy saved in the treatment group relative to the control 
group usage by RCT trial.  
Survey Sample 
We surveyed individuals in the same 27 states to assess the effects of normative and first-
order personal beliefs on this treatment effect. We recruited 2,001 participants (51% female; age: 
M=37.05, SD=54.88) on Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online labor market60,61, across the 27 states 
in which Opower operates. In advance of data collection, we aimed for equal representation of all 
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states in our dataset and specified to have at least 50 participants per state; we stopped recruitment 
when the sample size per state reached 100 participants or after three weeks of continuous data 
collection, whichever occurred first. For 7 (of 27) states, the smallest states in the Opower trials, 
we were unable to collect our target sample size. Unsurprisingly, the number of survey respondents 
in our sample was proportional to a state’s population (linear regression of state population 
predicting number of survey respondents, with robust standard errors: coeff=2.73 X 10-6, p=.020). 
Thus, smaller states were less likely to meet our minimum sample size criteria (linear regression 
of state population predicting the minimum threshold of at least 50 survey participants, with robust 
standard errors: coeff=2.8 X 10-8, p=.043). Our main analysis focuses on states where we have at 
least 50 participants; however, when we include participants from all 27 states, the results are 
qualitatively similar. 
To ensure survey responders were paying attention throughout the survey, we included an 
attention check, as commonly done on Mechanical Turk 62. Ninety-one percent out of 2,001 
participants passed the attention check; our final sample thus consists of 1,819 participants. 
Although our main analysis focuses on participants who passed the attention check, the results are 
qualitatively similar when we include participants who failed it. 
Predictor Variables: First-Order Personal and Second-Order Normative Beliefs 
Our main predictor variables were individuals’ first-order personal and second-order 
normative beliefs. Our survey participants were asked two questions about their beliefs toward 
energy conservation. One question elicited their first-order personal beliefs, asking to what extent 
participants thought, “reducing household energy contributes to saving the environment.” The 
other question elicited second-order normative beliefs, asking to what extent the survey respondent 
thought, “the majority of [his or her] neighbors (or community) thinks that reducing household 
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energy contributes to saving the environment.” Both questions were scored on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). First-order personal and second-order normative 
beliefs were elicited in randomized order. Because results are qualitatively similar regardless of 
question order, our analysis collapses across order. 
Dependent Variable: Energy Savings 
The outcome variable in our investigation is the standardized average monthly rate of 
energy conservation. The commonly used measure of energy conservation in the Opower trials is 
the energy savings rate, the percentage of energy saved in the treatment group relative to the 
control group usage by RCT trial. 
Control Variables 
 In Table 1 of the main text, we first report our results without any control variables (see 
Models 1-3). However, to check for robustness, we repeated the analysis including a number of 
control variables (see Models 5 and 6). First, we control for the duration of the RCT, as this has 
been implicated previously in Opower effectiveness 39. Second, we control for the amount of 
energy used in the control group of each particular state. This takes into account that some states 
might have higher levels of energy usage than others. Third, to ensure the effectiveness of 
descriptive norm interventions does not depend on people living together closer (e.g. densely-
populated cities), we control for population density at the state-level. Finally, we also control for 
age and gender of survey respondents, for which we compute the state-level average in our 
regressions. 
Analytic Strategy 
We use t-tests based on individual-level data when analyzing survey responses alone. 
Following ref. 39, when studying correlations between survey responses and energy savings, we 
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use linear regressions predicting average energy savings rates with inverse variance weighted by 
cohort size. For observations where the cohort size was missing (N = 12 trials; or 5.6% of all trials), 
we imputed the average cohort size in the sample; we followed a similar strategy with missing 
control group energy usage. Results are qualitatively similar when the observations with missing 
cohort size and control energy usage are excluded from the analysis.  
While we follow ref. 39 in most respects of the analysis, we cannot cluster standard errors 
on the household level because this data is not available to us. Instead, as a more conservative 
strategy, we cluster robust standard errors at the state level, which is the common unit of analysis 
between our datasets and accounts for potential correlation between first- and second-order beliefs 
within a state.  
Finally, we use standardized z-scores of both the independent and dependent variables for 
the analysis because our variables have different magnitudes and units; however, not standardizing 
these variables does not alter the significance or interpretation of our results. 
 
DATA AVAILABILITY 
The dataset containing household energy savings from 211 large-scale RCTs is Opower’s 
propriety data and may not currently be shared publicly. To inquire about access to the 
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Figure 1. An example of an Opower Home Energy Report. Customers in the treatment condition receive a bi-
monthly (or less frequent) mailing that compares their energy usage with that of similar, nearby households. These 
descriptive norm messages have been shown to be effective in influencing people to conserve energy, but the 
effectiveness of descriptive norm varies across U.S. states. 
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Figure 2. Second-order normative beliefs predict energy savings in 211 large-scale energy savings RCTs (pooled 
N = 16,198,595). The effect of second-order normative beliefs is plotted for a regression model with standardized 
coefficients based on the main sample (i.e., states that had at least 50 survey respondents) without and with covariates, 
as well as for a regression model with all states. Regardless of survey response rate, and covariates, second-order 
normative beliefs significantly predicted savings rate in all model specifications, while first-order personal beliefs did 
not. For each estimate, the outer (thin) error bar represents the 99% confidence interval, the middle error bar the 95%, 
and the inner (thick) error bar the 90% confidence intervals.  
Second-Order 
Normative Beliefs
First-Order 
Personal Beliefs
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Main sample 
with covariates
Full sample 
with covariates
Main sample 
without covariates
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Figure 3. Information given to all participants about their energy consumption in the experimental study. The design 
was closely modeled after the information Opower sends to its customers. 
 
Monthly Neighbor Comparison | You used 28% MORE energy than your neighbors
YOU
Your Neighbors
Your NeighborsYour Neighbors: Approximately 100 occupied nearby homes that are similar in size to yours.
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Table 1. Second-order normative beliefs predicted energy savings in 211 large-scale energy savings RCTs (pooled N 
= 16,198,595), whereas first-order personal beliefs did not. Model 1 shows that second-order normative beliefs 
predicted energy savings rates, while Model 2 shows that first-order personal beliefs did not predict energy savings 
rates. Model 3 lists the control variables derived from past research on Opower trials. When control variables are 
added to the main model in Model 4, the effect of second-order normative beliefs remains statistically significant. The 
main sample of states with at least 50 respondents is used in Models 1–5. All states regardless of sample size are 
included in Model 6. All variables are standardized (z-scores). Observations are weighted using cohort size by inverse 
variance. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state-level. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
VARIABLES       
       
Second-Order 
Normative Beliefs 
.755*  1.138*  1.030* 1.082*** 
(.323)  (.446)  (.385) (.281) 
First-Order Personal 
Beliefs 
 .209 -.696  .006 -.341 
 (.324) (.478)  (.629) (.499) 
Control group daily 
energy usage 
   .030 .072 .080 
   (.071) (.066) (.069) 
Program start date    -.370*** -.341*** -.339*** 
    (.050) (.052) (.051) 
State population density    -.075 -.154* -.124* 
    (.071) (.074) (.061) 
Average age of 
respondents in state 
   -.084 .298 .232 
   (.277) (.272) (.256) 
% female respondents in 
state 
   -.702 -.588 -.595 
   (.462) (.531) (.433) 
Constant -.240** -.214* -.237** -.147* -.173** -.165** 
 (.072) (.081) (.072) (.063) (.056) (.057) 
       
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 211 
R-squared .031 .002 .041 .250 .283 .264 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1 
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Supplementary Notes 
Additional Analyses in Opower Data 
Overall, survey respondents in every state indicated higher first-order personal than 
second-order normative beliefs (Figure S1). That is, across all states, participants indicated that 
they had stronger first-order personal beliefs about the extent to which energy conservation helps 
save the environment (M=4.95, SD=1.53) than they believed their neighbors did (M=4.14, 
SD=1.37), t(1,675)=19.51, p<0.001). This suggests that regardless of one’s state, people have 
stronger first-order personal beliefs about energy savings than they have second-order normative 
beliefs (see Figure S1).  
 
Figure S1. First-order personal beliefs are higher than second-order normative beliefs in all states. Respondents 
in our survey report that they believe that conserving energy helps the environment. In all states, these reported first-
order personal beliefs are higher than respondents’ second-order normative beliefs about the relevance of energy 
savings. The y-axis represents the first-order personal beliefs (red) and second-order normative beliefs (blue) 
measured on a 7-point scale (with higher values indicating more agreement with the corresponding belief). Error bars 
represent the 95% Confidence Interval. 
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Robustness Checks 
In addition to our main result presented in the main text (see Table 1 and Figure 2), we 
include robustness checks of our main regression results in this section. The robustness checks 
take into account alternative sampling weights to control for survey uptake in each state, focus 
only on trials without imputed averages for missing variables, and including survey respondents 
who did not pass the attention quiz, and show the relationship to an additional dependent variable 
(absolute amount of energy saved, rather than relative energy savings).  
For our first robustness test, we repeat the main analysis using the number of survey 
respondents in weighting observations to account for survey uptake, instead of cohort size (which 
we include as a control variable in the regression equation). A common approach to deal with 
independent and dependent variables that have been averaged from other datasets is to weigh 
observations in the regression by the inverse variance of the source file’s number of observations5. 
This approach was followed by ref. 4 using cohort size to weigh observations; we closely follow 
this analytical strategy in our main analysis. We find that the results are robust to this variation: 
second-order normative beliefs predict the savings rate (coeff=2.407, p<.001), but first-order 
personal beliefs do not (p=.155). When control variables and smaller states outside the main 
sample are included, second-order normative beliefs continue to be significant predictors (both 
ps<.001; see Table S1). 
Second, we repeat the main analysis with only Opower trials where there was no missing 
data in any variables (N=182 trials). While there is no effect of first-order personal beliefs (p=.352) 
on energy savings, second-order normative beliefs are a marginally significant predictor 
(coeff=.962, p=.076). The precision of the estimator increases when control variables (coeff=1.397, 
p=.003) and smaller states (coeff=1.503, p=.001, see Table S2) are included. 
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Third, we include all survey respondents in the main analysis, regardless of whether they 
did or did not pass the attention test during the survey (total N=2,001). As before, the savings rate 
is predicted by second-order normative beliefs (coeff=1.170, p=.003), but not by first-order 
personal beliefs (p=.135). The results are robust to including control variables and smaller states 
in the analysis (both ps<.01, see Table S3). 
Fourth, we repeat the main analysis with inverse-variance weights based on representative 
gender and age demographics in each state, based on the 2010 U.S. Census. For each gender and 
four age groups (based on the U.S. Census: 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, and 65+ years of age), weights 
were generated on a state-level to adjust the online survey sample to be more representative of the 
general U.S. population. The results are similar as prior model specifications (see Table S4). 
Finally, we repeat the main analysis using the amount of energy saved as the outcome 
vaiable, and find similar results to prior model specifications (see Table S5). 
In sum, we find that the distinct effect of second-order normative believs on energy savings 
is robust to a number of additional model specification, thus providing additional confidence in 
the results of our analysis. 
  
 Page 5 of 10 
Table S1. We repeat the main analysis with inverse-variance weights based on the number of survey respondents. 
Cohort size is added as an additional control variable for this analysis. Following SI ref. 4, in this and all other 
regression tables (unless specified otherwise), the program start date is the date (“td” format in Stata) when Opower 
started the RCT, divided by 365 (days). Additionally, all variables have been standardized (z-scores). Robust standard 
errors are clustered on the state-level. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES   
   
Second-Order Normative Beliefs 2.260*** 1.908*** 
(.433) (.342) 
First-Order Personal Beliefs -.955 -.527 
(.667) (.612) 
Control group daily energy usage  .047 
 (.094) 
Program start date  -.262*** 
  (0.051) 
Program cohort size  -.092 
  (.084) 
State population density  -.140* 
  (.064) 
Average age of respondents in state  -.327 
 (.292) 
% female respondents in state  -.586 
 (.538) 
Constant -.075 -.081 
 (.089) (.060) 
   
Observations 211 211 
R-squared .131 .251 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table S2. We repeated the main analysis restricting the sample to RCT programs without any missing data. All 
variables are standardized. Observations are weighed using cohort size by inverse variance. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the state-level. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES   
   
Second-Order Normative Beliefs .802* 1.186*** 
(.313) (.310) 
First-Order Personal Beliefs -.610 -.269 
(.361) (.510) 
Control group daily energy usage  .089 
 (.073) 
Program start date  -.341*** 
  (.056) 
State population density  -.145* 
  (.062) 
Average age of respondents in state  .283 
 (.287) 
% female respondents in state  -.629 
 (.461) 
Constant -.259*** -.165*** 
 (.070) (.056) 
   
Observations 199 199 
R-squared .028 .245 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table S3. We repeated the main analysis with all survey respondents regardless of whether or not they passed the 
attention test. Observations are weighed using cohort size by inverse variance. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the state-level. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES   
   
Second-Order Normative Beliefs 1.075*** 1.202** 
(.284) (.358) 
First-Order Personal Beliefs -1.010* -.647 
(.446) (.633) 
Control group daily energy usage  .070 
 (.065) 
Program start date  -.343*** 
  (.050) 
State population density  -.114+ 
  (.059) 
Average age of respondents in state  .176 
 (.249) 
% female respondents in state  -.497 
 (.518) 
Constant -.252** -.191** 
 (.068) (.062) 
   
Observations 211 211 
R-squared .042 .263 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table S4. We repeat the main analysis with inverse-variance weights based on representative gender and age 
demographics in each state, based on the 2010 U.S. Census. For each gender and four age groups (based on the U.S. 
Census: 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, and 65+ years of age), weights were generated on a state-level to adjust the online survey 
sample to be more representative of the general U.S. population. Cohort size is added as an additional control variable 
for this analysis; all variables have been standardized (z-scores). Robust standard errors are clustered on the state-
level. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES   
   
Second-Order Normative Beliefs .153* .102* 
(.058) (.040) 
First-Order Personal Beliefs .080 .067 
(.073) (.065) 
Control group daily energy usage  -.056 
 (.156) 
Program start date  -.772* 
  (.342) 
Program cohort size  -.097+ 
  (.054) 
State population density  .371 
  (.513) 
Constant .617 1.370+ 
 (.605) (.746) 
   
Observations 2,001 2,001 
R-squared .008 .085 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table S5. We repeat the main analysis using the amount of energy saved as outcome variable; all variables have been 
standardized (z-scores). Because the outcome variable in this regression is not normalized by the control group usage, 
the latter is a highly significant predictor of energy savings, consistent with findings in SI ref. 4. Robust standard 
errors are clustered on the state-level. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES   
   
Second-Order Normative Beliefs .854* .884* 
(0.311) (.352) 
First-Order Personal Beliefs -.661 -.373 
(.399) (.577) 
Control group daily energy usage .747*** .681*** 
(.089) (.082) 
Program start date  -.223*** 
  (.039) 
State population density  -.092+ 
  (.046) 
Average age of respondents in state  .309 
 (.220) 
% female respondents in state  -.317 
 (.482) 
Constant -.219** -.166** 
 (.063) (.054) 
   
Observations 211 211 
R-squared .467 .543 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
  
 Page 10 of 10 
Additional Analyses in the Experimental Study 
 In our pre-analysis plan (http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=xy3a4f), we pre-registered 
both the sample size as well as an exclusion criterion. At the end of the study, participants were 
asked whether they believed the information provided about energy conservation beliefs in their 
home county. Responses were binary (yes/no), and 213 participants (37.97%) indicated they were 
suspicious about the manipulation. There was no statistically significant difference in suspicion 
levels across conditions (t(559) = .83, p = .41). In the main text, we present the analysis excluding 
suspicious participants, concordant with the pre-analysis plan. Here, we report the results when 
including participants that were suspicious; all results remain qualitatively similar.  
When including all participants, participants in the high second-order beliefs condition had 
significantly higher levels of second-order beliefs (M=5.28, SD = 1.49) than participants in the low 
second-order beliefs condition (M=4.10, SD=1.55; t(559)=9.21, p<.001). We thus conclude that 
the manipulation check was successful. In addition, in the full sample, participants in the high 
second-order beliefs condition were also significantly more willing to reduce their energy 
consumption (M=5.65, SD=1.37) than participants in the low second-order beliefs condition (M 
=5.35, SD=1.46; t(559)=2.52, p=.012). These results hold when controlling for measured first-
order personal beliefs (B=.213, SE=.096, p=.027). In sum, the results of our experimental study 
thus provide causal support for the role of second-order normative beliefs in predicting energy 
conservation behavior. 
